How did we get from the euphoria of 1989 to the turmoil of 2026? The answer may be depressing—but we can’t afford to keep forgetting our mistakes, warns Ian Shapiro.
Really appreciate how thoughtful you two are. I think people sense things went really badly, but I don't think people reflect on how crucial that 2000-2012 period was.
Shapiro seems to make the standard US political analysis error of ignoring the way the racism of the white majority shapes political and economic alternatives. Anyone who saw the tea party rallies with their photoshopped placard pictures of Obama wearing a bone through his nose should have a better idea of the constraints for him and Biden. When he had latitude, as in the GM bailout (Ron Bloom for the win) or the American airlines bankruptcy or the nationalization of housing agency profits, Obama took decisive very much non-neoliberal action. White people (and many Hispanics and Asians) won't stand for social-democracy as long as it appears to reward Black people too.
I'd be more inclined to blame the overly cautious and conservative Harvard/Etc. economists, lawyers, and School of Government graduates who dominate Democratic administrations. For example, Obama's first term benefited from the strong connection to Eric Holder's mission driven Justice Department, but in the second term DOJ went overboard in a failed effort to show how independent they were instead of engaging in a scorched earth battle against voting rights limitations. Or consider the failure to fire or sideline Edward DeMarco or the pathetic hand waving of the attempt to close Guatanamo. But racism is the dark matter in US politics that bends space.
Unfortunately, a very one-sided analysis of Russia and NATO. It gives almost no attention to Russia's domestic politics, imperial ideology, and the reasons why so many of Russia's neighbours wanted NATO membership.
Maybe next time, before publishing such a confident-sounding headline, read and listen to scholars who actually specialize in Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Russian domestic politics, such as Serhii Plokhy, Timothy Snyder, and many others.
Even without going into the details: if NATO was really Putin's central concern, his invasion of Ukraine caused Sweden to abandon more than 200 years of neutrality and join NATO, alongside Finland.
And this line is particularly amusing:
"Now, of course, he may have become an authoritarian dictator anyway."
May have? Sad to see this level of analysis from two academics.
I appreciate the pushback. But I want to emphasize that this is an interview about a book. It’s not going to be as detailed as the book itself!
There’s lots of analysis of the domestic political incentives faced by Yeltsin and later Putin in both *After the Fall* and the lectures on which they’re based. Shapiro himself turned me on to the book Putinomics years ago, which you might enjoy.
As to your point about Putin’s invasion not being rationalizable as a response to NATO expansion: someone can lash out in response to X without, in any way, effectively improving their position with respect to X in the long term. People are myopic, weak-willed, wishful-thinking amnesiacs. But we should try to empathize with them anyway, if we want to live together on mutually acceptable terms.
We behaved friendly toward China - we gave them the One China Policy, we liberalized and let them into the WTO, Britain gave them back Hong Kong - and China has been ruthless nevertheless. Many commentators criticize America for being too accommodative toward China, giving them wealth and power that they are using to commit genocide and threaten Taiwan.
And at the same time, Shapiro says we behaved too cruelly toward Russia, provoking them into bad behavior. We should have helped them get rich and successful (like we did for China), and then they wouldn't be committing genocide or attacking neighbors, supposedly.
Maybe the commentators who think that being nice to China was a mistake are all separate from the commentators who think that we should have been nice to Russia. Or maybe there is some principled reason why you have to be nice to Russian people but you don't have to be nice to Chinese people (doubtful). Still, it would be nice to hear someone argue that we should conduct our foreign affairs according to some general principle, accepting that the outcomes will never be perfect but will at least be better on average - instead of blithely asserting that policy choices are mistakes anytime they precede unpleasant situations.
Maybe the problem is not so much centered about growth, but in the culture. That kind of intervention was mostly absent and/or ineffective post USSR debacle. Regarding China, they simply are a superpower acting like one. That is sometimes difficult to appreciate looking from the former only one that was.
Really appreciate how thoughtful you two are. I think people sense things went really badly, but I don't think people reflect on how crucial that 2000-2012 period was.
Thanks for that, A.W.—means a lot.
Shapiro seems to make the standard US political analysis error of ignoring the way the racism of the white majority shapes political and economic alternatives. Anyone who saw the tea party rallies with their photoshopped placard pictures of Obama wearing a bone through his nose should have a better idea of the constraints for him and Biden. When he had latitude, as in the GM bailout (Ron Bloom for the win) or the American airlines bankruptcy or the nationalization of housing agency profits, Obama took decisive very much non-neoliberal action. White people (and many Hispanics and Asians) won't stand for social-democracy as long as it appears to reward Black people too.
I think you’re right that there were very real constraints. Fwiw, Shapiro comes from South Africa—though he’s been US-based for decades now.
I'd be more inclined to blame the overly cautious and conservative Harvard/Etc. economists, lawyers, and School of Government graduates who dominate Democratic administrations. For example, Obama's first term benefited from the strong connection to Eric Holder's mission driven Justice Department, but in the second term DOJ went overboard in a failed effort to show how independent they were instead of engaging in a scorched earth battle against voting rights limitations. Or consider the failure to fire or sideline Edward DeMarco or the pathetic hand waving of the attempt to close Guatanamo. But racism is the dark matter in US politics that bends space.
great Convo! and Denmark mentioned!
I've ordered the book from my library.
Probably not exactly what professor Shapiro wanted, but I plan on reading it.
Who doesn’t love it when people go to the library? (Other than Amazon I suppose)
I think he prefers I buy it.
Extremely rare for me to go from an interview to actually go read the book, but I'm going to do that. Just read the first page now.
Thank you for reading—on both counts!
Still have to read, but thanks for consistently doing the transcripts!
It’s fun! Except when I have to confront my many “ums” and “you knows.”
Would you consider a YouTube upload of the interview - for listening on the go?
Working on it!
FYI: You can text to voice it using the substack app. It's how I listened while grading before class this morning.
Unfortunately, a very one-sided analysis of Russia and NATO. It gives almost no attention to Russia's domestic politics, imperial ideology, and the reasons why so many of Russia's neighbours wanted NATO membership.
Maybe next time, before publishing such a confident-sounding headline, read and listen to scholars who actually specialize in Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Russian domestic politics, such as Serhii Plokhy, Timothy Snyder, and many others.
Even without going into the details: if NATO was really Putin's central concern, his invasion of Ukraine caused Sweden to abandon more than 200 years of neutrality and join NATO, alongside Finland.
And this line is particularly amusing:
"Now, of course, he may have become an authoritarian dictator anyway."
May have? Sad to see this level of analysis from two academics.
I appreciate the pushback. But I want to emphasize that this is an interview about a book. It’s not going to be as detailed as the book itself!
There’s lots of analysis of the domestic political incentives faced by Yeltsin and later Putin in both *After the Fall* and the lectures on which they’re based. Shapiro himself turned me on to the book Putinomics years ago, which you might enjoy.
As to your point about Putin’s invasion not being rationalizable as a response to NATO expansion: someone can lash out in response to X without, in any way, effectively improving their position with respect to X in the long term. People are myopic, weak-willed, wishful-thinking amnesiacs. But we should try to empathize with them anyway, if we want to live together on mutually acceptable terms.
This is great, Professor Muñoz! I’ve been chewing on it for several days.
Earlier today I read this old piece by Adam Tooze and thought it might have some connections with Professor Shapiro’s discussion of the structure vs agency problem: https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-75-being-realistic-about?r=1fn2p&utm_medium=ios
We behaved friendly toward China - we gave them the One China Policy, we liberalized and let them into the WTO, Britain gave them back Hong Kong - and China has been ruthless nevertheless. Many commentators criticize America for being too accommodative toward China, giving them wealth and power that they are using to commit genocide and threaten Taiwan.
And at the same time, Shapiro says we behaved too cruelly toward Russia, provoking them into bad behavior. We should have helped them get rich and successful (like we did for China), and then they wouldn't be committing genocide or attacking neighbors, supposedly.
Maybe the commentators who think that being nice to China was a mistake are all separate from the commentators who think that we should have been nice to Russia. Or maybe there is some principled reason why you have to be nice to Russian people but you don't have to be nice to Chinese people (doubtful). Still, it would be nice to hear someone argue that we should conduct our foreign affairs according to some general principle, accepting that the outcomes will never be perfect but will at least be better on average - instead of blithely asserting that policy choices are mistakes anytime they precede unpleasant situations.
Maybe the problem is not so much centered about growth, but in the culture. That kind of intervention was mostly absent and/or ineffective post USSR debacle. Regarding China, they simply are a superpower acting like one. That is sometimes difficult to appreciate looking from the former only one that was.